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Cognitive flexibilitySuccessful peer relations in older children depend on proficiency
with banter, which in turn frequently involves verbal irony.
Individual differences in successful irony interpretation have tradi-
tionally been attributed to theory of mind. Our premise was that
the key factor might in fact be cognitive flexibility, that is, the abil-
ity to switch between different perspectives (here, on the same
utterance). We also wished to extend the focus of previous irony
studies, which have almost exclusively examined simple irony,
where the literal meaning conflicts with observable physical evi-
dence (e.g., ‘‘Great day for a picnic” when viewing a downpour).
Therefore, we also examined how children interpreted more com-
plex irony,where listeners must consider at a deeper level the com-
mon ground shared with the speakers (e.g., general
knowledge/cultural common ground or information about the par-
ticular speaker). In Study 1, we found that for 6- to 8-year-olds,
both cognitive flexibility and theory of mind contributed unique
variance to simple irony interpretation while statistically control-
ling for nonverbal reasoning and structural language standardized
scores. Neither inhibitory control, nor working memory, nor gen-
eral knowledge correlated with irony interpretation. The 6- to 8-
year-olds were at floor for complex irony. In Study 2, we found that
cognitive flexibility contributed unique variance to how 10- to 12-
year-olds interpreted complex irony while controlling for nonver-
bal reasoning, structural language, and specific knowledge
required. We are the first to examine the relationship with cogni-
tive flexibility and conclude that it must be taken into account
2 M. Zaja˛czkowska, K. Abbot-Smith / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 199 (2020) 104942when investigating the relationship between theory of mind and
irony interpretation.
 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
As children get older, one of the most obvious individual differences in their social communication
and interaction is the ability to quickly interpret the communicative intent associated with banter,
teasing, and joking around with their peers. A vital aspect of such banter and joking often involves pro-
ficiency with verbal irony interpretation (e.g., Leggitt & Gibbs, 2000). Verbal irony prototypically
involves a contrast between an utterance’s literal meaning and its intended meaning (e.g., Wilson,
2013).
In the developmental literature, children’s ability to interpret verbal irony has almost ubiquitously
been tested using vignettes in which the addressee can observe that the literal meaning cannot be true
(see Filippova, 2014, for an overview). For example, if a boy says ‘‘Well done!” to a friend when she
spills juice down her shirt, the visual contrast with the ruined shirt makes the boy’s intended meaning
evident. We refer to this type of irony usage as simple irony. However, as children become teenagers,
they increasingly also use more complex irony (e.g., Aijmer, 2019). In Example (1) below, the listener
must engage in a more in-depth analysis to determine the speaker’s communicative intent.
(1) Tom: Can you help me cook the dinner? I’m tired.
Sally: Oh yes, because I have just been sitting around doing nothing at school today.
To date, only Bosco and Bucciarelli (2008) have examined how children interpret simple irony ver-
sus complex irony. Their characterization of this distinction focused on the fact that complex irony
requires the listener to compute a chain of interferences. Our characterization differs a little in focus.
In the simplest forms of irony—and the type most frequently tested in the child literature—the literal
meaning conflicts with physical evidence from the real-world context. In contrast, the correct inter-
pretation of complex ironic statements, such as that of Sally’s in Example (1) above, must require cul-
tural/general knowledge (here, that people generally do not do ‘‘nothing” during the school day). Our
aim in the current two studies was to explore which cognitive abilities relate to individual differences
in children’s proficiency with inferring the communicative intent of verbal irony and whether these
relationships with other cognitive abilities differ for simple irony versus complex irony.Cognitive correlates of irony interpretation
The ability of a child or an adolescent to successfully interpret the communicative intent of an iro-
nic utterance depends on a number of factors. Some influential factors relate to the child’s prior lan-
guage experience. For example, the frequency with which irony is used for certain functions in a
particular language community affects ease of acquisition (e.g., Filippova, 2014; see also Banasik-
Jemielniak & Bokus, 2019, for a discussion of cross-cultural variation). Furthermore, children build
up expectations regarding which types of speaker relationships (e.g., between siblings vs. between
strangers) result in more frequent use of irony (e.g., Whalen, Doyle, & Pexman, 2020). Learning the role
played by prosody is also arguably dependent on language experience.
Other factors driving proficiency in irony interpretation concern child-internal cognitive abilities.
These are the focus of the current article. One cognitive skill that is an obvious prerequisite for irony
interpretation is structural language, that is, the words and morphosyntax used to convey convention-
alized meaning (e.g., Abbot-Smith, 2020). A large number of studies have found that structural lan-
guage—or at least vocabulary—relates to children’s ability to successfully interpret irony (Angeleri &
Airenti, 2014; Caillies, Bertot, Motte, Raynaud, & Abely, 2014; Filippova & Astington, 2008; Godbee
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& Huyder, 2011).
Another cognitive skill that seems likely to relate to irony interpretation is theory of mind. This is
the ability to understand that others may have perspectives, knowledge, or beliefs that differ from
one’s own (e.g., Wellman, 2014). There is a fairly long history to claims that the ability to interpret ver-
bal irony may depend on theory of mind—particularly more advanced theory of mind such as the abil-
ity to represent one individual’s knowledge of a second individual’s knowledge or belief (Happé,
1993). The logic behind this claim is that to understand ironic intent, a child must understand that
the speaker has a particular mental state attitude toward the content of her or his utterance. Advanced
theory of mind ability is often assessed in tests such as Happé’s (1994) ‘‘Strange Stories,” in which chil-
dren are asked to explain white lies, double bluffs, and miscommunication. There are indeed a consid-
erable number of studies that found relationships between theory of mind and irony interpretation in
children (e.g., Angeleri & Airenti, 2014; Banasik, 2013; Caillies et al., 2014; Filippova & Astington,
2008; Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2013; Nilsen et al., 2011), although not all of them controlled for struc-
tural language in their analyses (see Matthews, Biney, & Abbot-Smith, 2018, for a review).
However, other less frequently investigated cognitive abilities may potentially be as important—or
more important—for successful irony interpretation. Some likely contenders can be found under the
umbrella term of executive functions (EFs), which encompasses higher-level cognitive skills required
for cognitive control (Diamond, 2013). One EF component is working memory. This is the ability to
maintain and update information held in short-term memory. Although a certain working memory
capacity is likely to be a prerequisite for any aspect of language processing and interpretation (e.g.,
Kidd, 2013), it may come under particular pressure in the types of tasks typically used to assess chil-
dren’s interpretation of verbal irony. These tasks involve a participant listening to a background story
vignette about two characters, where the vignette ends with a character making an ironic statement.
Thus, the task itself clearly requires a child to retain and build a mental model of a fair amount of infor-
mation. Nonetheless, a study by Filippova andAstington (2008),which examined relationships between
irony interpretation and both advanced theory of mind and working memory, established that the lat-
ter—although important—was not the most crucial factor in accounting for how 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds
interpreted irony. That is, whereas the relationship between irony andworkingmemory showed amed-
ium effect size, advanced theory of mind (assessed by a combination of second-order false belief,
Strange Stories, and faux pas understanding) still contributed a significant amount of variance to chil-
dren’s irony interpretation scores over and above working memory and structural language.1
The second key component of EF is inhibitory control (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, &
Howerter, 2000), which is the ability to suppress a habitual response or distracting information in
order to focus on the task at hand. Inhibitory control is plausibly implicated in irony interpretation
because to access the ironic interpretation of a particular utterance, a listener may need to suppress
the same utterance’s literal interpretation. To date, only Caillies and colleagues have examined
whether inhibitory control correlated with child irony interpretation (e.g., Caillies et al., 2014). How-
ever, their findings are difficult to interpret. Although they found a significant correlation between
irony interpretation and inhibitory control for their sample of typically developing children (aged
6–10 years), this was not the case for their sample of children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity dis-
order, which is widely thought to involve an impairment in inhibitory control. Most problematic was
that Caillies et al. (2014) included only 15 participants per group and did not statistically control for
structural language. Therefore, the specificity of the relationship between inhibitory control and irony
interpretation in children is as yet unclear.The importance of cognitive flexibility for irony interpretation
The third important component of EF is cognitive flexibility (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996), which is
the ability to switch between ‘‘multiple representations, strategies or responses” (Chevallier et al.,1 Nilsen and Bacso (2017) also found a relationship with working memory in their sample of adolescents, but unfortunately their
outcome variable conflated irony interpretation with referential communication.
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Card Sort tasks, in which a participant must first sort cards according to one rule (e.g., same color) and
then switch to sorting the same cards using a different strategy (e.g., same shape). Here, the measure
of inflexibility is the number of perseverative errors made, that is, where a participant continues to use
the previous strategy after the rule switch has occurred. Cognitive flexibility is clearly a multifaceted
ability requiring both working memory to retain the current rule and inhibitory control to suppress
the previous rule (Diamond, 2013), and thus it is often considered to be the epitome of EF (Zelazo
& Müller, 2007). Nonetheless, cognitive flexibility is not merely a composite skill given that it crucially
also involves the ability to switch between multiple perspectives simultaneously (Jacques & Zelazo,
2005).
This ability to switch between multiple perspectives is logically essential for irony interpretation
for two reasons. The first reason is that to interpret an utterance as ironic, one needs to be aware of
not only its nonliteral meaning (to correctly interpret and respond) but also its literal meaning (to
understand that usage of this literal meaning is being ‘‘mocked” in some sense) (e.g., Wilson, 2013).
The second reason why cognitive flexibility is likely to be pivotal is that if irony interpretation is at
least partially dependent on some form of theory of mind, this in itself requires a child to simultane-
ously hold in mind his or her own perspective as well as the perspective of the interlocutor. Indeed,
this may be why training cognitive flexibility in preschoolers leads to better performance in theory
of mind tasks (Kloo & Perner, 2003). Strangely, despite this logical fundamental relationship between
irony interpretation and cognitive flexibility, no study to date has investigated whether cognitive flex-
ibility correlates with irony understanding (cf. Zaja˛czkowska, Abbot-Smith, & Kim, 2020). Thus, the
relationship between cognitive flexibility and irony interpretation was the primary research question
of the current two studies.
The current studies
We carried out two studies to determine the degree to which cognitive flexibility accounts for
unique variance in children’s ability to interpret simple and complex irony. To this end, we also
assessed children on theory of mind, requisite knowledge, structural language, and nonverbal reason-
ing. The latter is usually assessed via a form of the Matrices task—a test of visual analogical reasoning
that in some cases comprises the only ability assessed by certain IQ tests (e.g., Raven, 1986). Nonverbal
reasoning is likely to be important for strategy use in any type of development test. It is also demon-
strably highly intercorrelated with EF in typically developing children (e.g., Ardila, Pineda, & Rosselli,
2000; Arffa, 2007). Problematically, nonverbal reasoning to date has been given no consideration in
child irony interpretation literature (see Matthews et al., 2018).
For our irony measure, we wished to develop a new method. This was because previous methods
either required children to formulate in their own words the speaker’s intent (e.g., Angeleri & Airenti,
2014; Caillies et al., 2014; Filippova & Astington, 2008) or required them to choose between two
options, namely a literal meaning versus a nonliteral meaning (e.g., Happé, 1993; Massaro et al.,
2014; Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2013, 2019; Nilsen et al., 2011). The latter—binary forced choice—is
problematic given that children show an awareness that simple ironic utterances are not intended lit-
erally long before they are able to determine the actual communicative intent of the utterances (e.g.,
Hancock, Dunham, & Purdy, 2010). Therefore, they may succeed in a binary forced choice without
truly comprehending the ironic meaning.
A binary choice is particularly problematic when complex irony is included; a listener may under-
stand in Example (1) above that Sally has not literally been sitting around doing nothing all day with-
out necessarily understanding Sally’s communicative intent. That is, Sally is not necessarily refusing to
help cook dinner. Rather, she is primarily expressing her annoyance at the assumption that only Tom
is tired. For this reason, for our two studies, the key irony outcome variable required children to
choose among three options. Nonetheless, for consistency with the previous literature, in Study 1
we also asked children (prior to the forced choice) to explain in their own words what the speaker
meant.
In Study 1, we tested typically developing, monolingual English-speaking children on their ability
to interpret simple and complex irony. For this study, we selected children aged 6, 7, and 8 years. This
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in child irony interpretation studies (e.g., Caillies et al., 2014; Filippova & Astington, 2008). We also
assessed their structural language, nonverbal reasoning, general knowledge, theory of mind, inhibitory
control, working memory, and cognitive flexibility. Because the children in Study 1 were essentially at
floor in their interpretation of complex irony, in our follow-up study we assessed the interpretation of
complex irony by 10-, 11-, and 12-year-olds. The majority of these children were in their first year of
secondary school in England, which children usually start on the September following their 11th
birthday. In secondary school, proficiency with irony starts to play a more important role in banter
between peers. Our focus here was the relationship between complex irony and children’s structural
language, nonverbal reasoning, knowledge, advanced theory of mind, and cognitive flexibility. Our
overarching hypothesis was that whereas knowledge, nonverbal reasoning, structural language, and
theory of mind all would significantly correlate with irony interpretation, cognitive flexibility would
contribute unique variance to the ability to interpret both simple and complex irony.Study 1
Method
Participants
We tested 57 typically developing, monolingual English-speaking 6-, 7-, and 8-year-olds. All were
recruited via and tested in the Kent Child Development Unit in southern England. Children whose par-
ents said they suspected language or reading difficulties or any developmental difficulties were not
invited to attend testing. Of the sample, 6 children were tested but excluded from all analyses because
they failed the ‘‘attention check,” which is described below. Thus, the final sample consisted of 51 chil-
dren (22 boys) with a mean age of 90.44 months (SD = 9.68, range = 74–109). All were within the typ-
ically developing range on our measure of structure language, namely the Formulated Sentences
subtest of the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals–Fifth Edition (CELF-5; Wiig, Semel, &
Secord, 2013):M = scaled score of 12.33, range = scaled score of 8 to 19. Ethical approval was obtained
from the School of Psychology ethics committee at the University of Kent. Children attended appoint-
ments in the Kent Child Development Unit with their parents. The vast majority of parents remained
in the lab waiting room during testing, and the rest sat behind their children and were requested not
to speak. Child assent was also always obtained, and a number of testing breaks were offered.Irony task
Stimuli development. We first developed 42 vignettes ending in ironic criticism based on items from
the previous literature as well as examples from children’s books and films. We categorized these
items as simple irony if the ironic intent was obvious from real-world evidence in the immediate con-
text (i.e., what the addressee had just seen and/or heard). Conversely, we categorized these items as
complex irony if the ironic intent could not be deduced in this manner but instead depended on access-
ing cultural common ground and/or information about the protagonists’ relationship.
These items were then presented individually in a written format to 38 neurotypical, monolingual
English-speaking adults who were naïve to the research question. The majority completed this for
coursework credit as part of an undergraduate psychology program. For each item, participants were
first asked to select the correct response (among three possible responses) and were then asked to
rank, on a 9-point Likert scale, the degree to which they thought an 8-year-old would have difficulty
in understanding the item, where 9 was the highest level of difficulty. All items for which the mean
accuracy was 2.5 standard deviations below the mean for all irony items were removed from the level
of difficulty ratings. Across all participants, only items for which a particular participant gave a correct
response were included in our analysis of the level of difficulty ratings.
When selecting items for the child studies, there were a few items that, on consideration, were
deemed too difficult to film. From the remaining items, we selected for the complex irony condition
the five items that received the highest difficulty ratings within this category. For simple irony, we
selected the five items that received the lowest difficulty ratings out of the simple irony items.
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simple irony and complex irony categories regarding the difficulty ratings and some overlap in terms
of mean accuracy.
Finally, we also created five literal interpretation items for our attention check that were equated
with the irony items in complexity. An example of one literal item is given in Example (2) below. The
complex irony, simple irony, and literal conditions were then matched in terms of the mean number of
words and the number of mental state verbs in their vignettes. To achieve this, some of the original
stories were slightly modified for the purpose of matching.
(2) Tom and Sally are wrapping presents.
Sally: What picture is on your wrapping paper?
Tom: It’s got Father Christmas on it!
Q: What does Tom mean?
A. I don’t really like wrapping presents at Christmas time.
B. A birthday present shouldn’t be wrapped in Christmas wrapping paper.
C. I’m just telling you what picture is on the paper.Development of video-recorded vignettes. The task itself consisted of five simple irony, five complex
irony, and five literal (attention check) items. For each item, participants saw and heard a short video
of a two- or three-line dialogue between a male speaker and a female speaker, ending with the target
utterance. To ensure that the literal and ironic target utterances did not differ in terms of intonation,
the target utterances were video-recorded before the actors knew about the prior context of the vign-
ettes. Thus, the actors were blind to whether the target utterances were intended ironically or literally
and were also instructed to maintain neutral intonation and emphasis. The simple irony vignettes all
involved a conflict between the visual evidence and the literal meaning of the ironist’s final statement
(see Appendix B). The literal meaning of the ironist’s statement in the complex irony vignettes was
also untrue [see Example (3) below], but to determine this the listener needed the requisite cultural
knowledge (here, an invitation to a party given by the Queen would be an extremely rare and thus
highly unlikely occurrence, and so Sally is insinuating that this also holds true of Tom’s claim).
(3) Tom: I have been invited to a party by the most beautiful girl in my class.
Sally: Yeah, and I have been invited to the Queen’s party.Q: What does she mean?
A. I think that the Queen’s party would be more interesting.
B. I don’t believe that you were invited to that girl’s party.
C. I don’t want to talk about that beautiful girl’s party.Task administration and coding
All participants were presented with the irony task via PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). First, the experi-
menter explained the task to participants and administered two practice trials, for which feedback
was given if required. These practice trials were always the two literal language trials shown in
Appendix A and were similar in structure and sentence length to the test trials. The order of the simple
irony, complex irony, and literal (attention check) items was fully randomized. For each item, partic-
ipants first saw the video, which they could replay as many times as they wished.
For this study, we had two outcome measures for irony interpretation. The first involved open-
ended questions following a number of studies in this field (e.g., Angeleri & Airenti, 2014; Caillies
et al., 2014; Filippova & Astington 2008). Thus, the next screen for each item showed a visual display
of the final part of the video interaction, and the experimenter asked an open-ended question (‘‘Why
did [the speaker] say [target statement]?”). Responses to the irony items all were audio-recorded,
transcribed, and coded by the first author and another independent rater into one of the three
following categories. Cohen’s kappa was .81, reflecting a good level of agreement. Items for which
raters differed were recoded by the first author following discussion.
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the story, or saying ‘‘I don’t know.”
1. Responses reflecting simple surface-level justifications or a reference to (accurately described)
states or feelings of the speaker (‘‘Because she was mad”) or reflecting learned conventional
answers (e.g., ‘‘That is not a nice thing to do”).
2. Responses with a reference made to the speaker’s attitude toward the situation and to the prag-
matic function of irony (e.g., ‘‘She did not want to be too harsh at her since she was just a little girl
and she didn’t mean to spill it all over the picture,” ‘‘She wanted to make the accident a little less
serious”).
Following this, for each item participants were assessed on the second irony outcome measure
(forced choice). Here, participants simultaneously heard (and saw in writing) the question ‘‘What does
(s)he mean?” while seeing a ‘‘still” visual display of the interaction. Below this still clip, participants
saw a picture of the speaker’s face accompanied by three initially blank speech bubbles. Participants
could click on each speech bubble in any order, upon which they would simultaneously hear (and read
if at reading age) that particular response option. The simple irony vignettes can be seen in Appendix B
together with their response options and the mean accuracy scores of the adult participants.
After listening to all possible answers, participants selected one by clicking on a ‘‘pick me” button,
which was located on each of the speech bubbles. Children could also play each of the possible
answers as many times as they needed by clicking on the speaker icon in each speech bubble. There
were three different script orders so that for each vignette across the sample of participants the target
answer could appear either first, second, or third.
Additional measures
The following tasks were always presented after the above task and were carried out in the same
order as listed below. The testing was divided into three 30-min sessions carried out on the same day
but with lengthy breaks for free play and snacks between each session. Additional breaks were added
if children requested.
Inhibitory control. This was assessed via a computer-based version of the Stroop task. Importantly,
children in England start school at 4 years of age, and thus all children in our sample could read
the color words used. Computer keys were overlaid with colors, and participants were asked to
respond by pressing the color that matched the color of the font (and ignore the meaning of the word,
which described a different color). For each participant, we excluded data from error trials and outlier
trials (i.e., all reaction times < 200 ms or 2.5 standard deviations above the mean). The difference
between mean reaction times in the incongruent condition and the congruent condition was calcu-
lated for each participant. A higher score is taken to indicate more inference and thus poorer inhibitory
control.
Working memory. This was assessed using a semi-computerized version of the Backward Digit Span
subscale of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC; Wechsler, 2003). That is, the experi-
menter explained the instructions ‘‘live” and provided feedback on the practice items, but the actual
stimuli for the test items were prerecorded and administered via button press. For this measure,
higher scores indicate greater working memory capacity. The total possible raw score was 16, but
because the ceiling (stopping rule) is one score of zero for an item, the actual highest raw score
achieved in our sample was 12. (Details regarding standardized scores are given in Table 1.)
Structural language. This was assessed using the Formulated Sentences subtest of the CELF-5. This
requires children to formulate a series of increasingly complex sentences on the basis of a picture
and some keywords (e.g., car, before). Each item is scored on a 3-point scale in relation to semantics
and morphosyntax. The total possible raw score was 48, but because the ceiling (stopping rule) was
four consecutive scores of zero, the actual highest raw score achieved in our sample was 44. (Details
regarding standardized scores are given in Table 1.)
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whereby participants were informed every time the rule changed (but not what the new rule was).
The key measure was the raw number of perseverative errors recorded in PsychoPy. Thus, for this
measure, higher scores indicate poorer cognitive flexibility.General knowledge. This was assessed using the Information subtest of the WISC (Wechsler, 2003),
which consists of 33 questions such as ‘‘What must you do to make water boil?”.Nonverbal reasoning. This was assessed using the Matrices subtest of the British Ability Scale–Third
Edition (BAS-3; Elliot & Smith, 2011). For each item, children were shown an incomplete matrix or pat-
tern of pictures or else abstract geometric shapes at the top of the page. For each item, children were
asked to select the option (from a row at the bottom of the page) which best completed the matrix.
This subtest is extremely similar to Matrices subtests on other intelligence tests standardized for chil-
dren such as theWechsler Preschool and Primary Sale of Intelligence–Fourth Edition (Wechsler, 2012).
The total possible raw score was 51, but due to the application of ceiling (stopping rules), the actual
highest raw score achieved in our sample was 26. (Details regarding standardized scores are given in
Table 1.)Theory of mind direct measure. This was assessed using four items from Happé’s (1994) Strange Stories.
The particular stories selected assessed understanding of lying to persuade (‘‘Kittens”), white lies
(‘‘Christmas Present”), miscommunication (‘‘Burglar’s Glove”), and double bluff (Malkin, Abbot-
Smith, Williams, & Ayling’s [2018] ‘‘Biscuits” version). Vocabulary was simplified, and many more
illustrations were used than in the original versions. All stories were presented on a laptop, and the
narration was prerecorded and played via loudspeakers. The experimenter administered the test ques-
tions ‘‘live.” All responses were audio-recorded, transcribed, and scored by the first author. The scoring
system was derived from White, Hill, Happé, and Frith (2009). Two points were given if children
referred to the character’s inference about the mental state of the other person (e.g., ‘‘persuade,”
‘‘things that [X] doesn’t know,” ‘‘trick,” ‘‘thought that [X] knew,” ‘‘sparing [X’s] feelings”). One point
was given if children referred to the outcome (e.g., ‘‘getting rid of the kittens,” ‘‘to stop [X] eating bis-
cuits”) or trait (e.g., ‘‘she’s nice,” ‘‘she’s lying”) with no reference to protagonist’s understanding of
thoughts. Zero points were given if children referred to irrelevant or incorrect facts. An additional
one half (0.5) point was given for passing the control questions for the ‘‘” ‘‘Kittens”’ (white lie) and
‘‘Biscuits” (double bluff) vignettes. This meant that the total possible maximum score that children
could attain for Strange Stories was 9. An experienced independent rater scored the performance of
11 participants blind to the ratings of the first author. Reliability was excellent; the average intraclass
correlation coefficient (ICC) was .99.Theory of mind indirect measure. Parents completed the Theory of Mind Inventory (ToMI; Hutchins,
Prelock, & Bonazinga, 2012), which is a standardized questionnaire assessing the precursor, first-
order, second-order, and advanced theory of mind. The original version of the ToMI did contain a
few items specifically examining understanding of figurative language or hypotheticals (Items 2, 13,
29, and 36) rather than theory of mind. However, these four items were removed prior to analysis.
For this reason, we used raw scores rather than standardized scores for this measure in our analyses.
In the version we used, there were 38 items, each of which was scored on a scale from 0 to 20 (where
0 = definitely not and 20 = definitely). The overall mean was calculated. Thus, the maximum possible
score was 20.Results
The full anonymized datasets are available on the Open Sciences Framework web pages (https://
osf.io/25k9m/).
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For the forced-choice measure, children performed significantly better for simple irony
(M = .76/1.00 correct, SD = .25) than for complex irony (M = .26/1.00 correct, SD = .23), t
(50) = 12.89, p < .001. The same pattern was found for the open-ended question measures, t
(45) = 9.12, p < .001, with participants performing better for simple irony (M = .48/1.00 correct,
SD = .29), whereas for complex irony they were at floor (M = .10/1.00 correct, SD = .12). Because par-
ticipants found the open-ended response measure difficult, only forced-choice responses were
included in the main analyses.
Predictors
The nonverbal reasoning data were missing for 4 children. Parents of 2 additional children did not
complete the ToMI questionnaire. Therefore, 45 children (19 boys) with a mean age of 89.8 months
(range = 74–109) were included in the following analyses. For predictors based on standardized mea-
sures (nonverbal reasoning, structural language (CELF-5), general knowledge (WISC Information sub-
test), and Backward Digit Span (WISC), we used the standardized scores (i.e., T-scores or scaled scores).
The descriptive statistics for the predictors of theoretical interest are shown in Table 1.Table 1
Descriptive statistics for Study 1.
M SD Min score Max score N
Nonverbal reasoning (BAS-3) T score 49.24 11.11 21 72 45
Structural language (Formulated Sentences scaled score) 12.42 2.50 8 19 45
Theory of mind direct (Strange Stories) 4.22 2.29 0 9 45
Theory of mind indirect (ToMI questionnaire) 16.80 1.62 13.20 19.70 45
General knowledge (WISC Information Test scaled score) 11.42 2.45 5 18 45
Working memory (Backward Digit Span scaled score) 11.69 2.54 8 18 45
Inhibitory control (Stroop RT incongruent  RT congruent) 190.04 141.22 71.31 533.70 45
Cognitive flexibility (Card Sort) raw perseverative errors 10.29 7.06 1 33 45
Simple irony (forced choice) 3.71/5 1.27 0 5 45
Complex irony (forced choice) 1.27/5 1.16 0 5 45
Note. BAS-3, British Ability Scale–Third Edition; ToMI, Theory of Mind Inventory; WISC, Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children;
RT, reaction time.Correlational analyses
Table 2 outlines which factors correlated with simple irony versus complex irony for Study 1. As
can be seen, only parent-assessed theory of mind (ToMI), r(45) = .40, p = .007, and cognitive flexibility,
r(45) = .44, p = .003, correlated significantly with simple irony. The relationship with nonverbal rea-
soning was of marginal significance, r(45) = .29, p = .058.
Predictors of simple irony interpretation in 6- to 8-year-olds
We first converted all variables to z scores and then entered them into a hierarchical linear regres-
sion. Scaled scores for nonverbal reasoning (Matrices subtest of BAS-3) and structural language (CELF
Formulated Sentences subtest) were entered into the first step. This led to a model that approached
significance, F(2, 42) = 2.59, p = .087, and accounted for 11% of the variance. Then, theory of mind,
executive functioning, and general knowledge predictors all were entered into the second step. This
led to a significant model, F(8, 36) = 3.35, p = .006, accounting for 43% of variance overall and showing
an R2 change of .32. As can be seen from Table 3, in this second step only Card Sort (cognitive flexibil-
ity) and the ToMI (indirect measure of theory of mind) were significant predictors, accounting for 12%
and 9% of variance, respectively. The ToMI showed a positive relationship with simple irony interpre-
tation (as expected given that positive scores on both measures indicate better performance). The Card
Sort task showed a negative relationship with simple irony interpretation (again as expected given
that higher scores on the Card Sort task indicate poorer cognitive flexibility). Multicollinearity was
not a concern (tolerance for all > .60).
To verify our results, we reran the same analysis, this time including only those predictors that
were significant or of marginal significance in the first analysis, namely nonverbal reasoning, cognitive
Table 2
Correlations with irony for Study 1.
Note. BAS-3, British Ability Scale–Third Edition; ToMI, Theory of Mind Inventory; WISC, Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children;
RT, reaction time.
10 M. Zaja˛czkowska, K. Abbot-Smith / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 199 (2020) 104942flexibility (Card Sort), and the indirect theory of mind measure (ToMI). The same pattern of results was
found, whereby Card Sort (b = .37, t = 2.90, p = .006) and the ToMI (b = .35, t = 2.78, p = .008) still
accounted for unique variance (13% and 12%, respectively).2 Regarding potential multicollinearity, here
the values for tolerance were excellent (all > .94).Predictors of complex irony interpretation in 6- to 8-year-olds
When the same hierarchical linear regression was carried out for complex irony, the model at the
first step was not significant, F(2, 44) = 1.12, p = .34. This did not improve (p = .20) at the second step
once the predictor variables were entered. Indeed, the only predictor to even marginally correlate with
complex irony was direct theory of mind (Strange Stories), r(47) = .28, p = .06.2 When only cognitive flexibility (Card Sort) and the indirect theory of mind measure (ToMI) were included, these accounted for
17% (p = .002) and 14% (p = .006) of the unique variance, respectively.
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For the interpretation of simple irony by children of this age, cognitive flexibility accounted for
unique variance when nonverbal reasoning, structural language, and theory of mind were entered into
the same analysis, thereby supporting our main hypothesis. However, no factors were significantly
related to complex irony interpretation by children in this age group. The most likely interpretation
for this latter finding is that this age group did not comprehend complex irony at all; among a choice
of three items per trial, children selected the correct option only 26% of the time on average.Study 2
To examine the correlates of complex irony, we carried out a follow-up study (Study 2) with 10- to
12-year-olds. We assessed only the interpretation of complex irony in this second study because we
assumed that this age group would be at ceiling on simple irony (see, e.g., Demorest, Meyer, Phelps,
Gardner, & Winner, 1984; Pexman & Glenwright, 2007). We again controlled for nonverbal reasoning
and structural language, selecting the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler,
2011) Matrices and Vocabulary measures because they are standardized for this age group. Because
it is much easier to test the target age group in schools, we needed to reduce the total amount of test-
ing time per child and avoid asking parents to complete a lengthy questionnaire. Therefore, we only




We tested 97 typically developing, monolingual English-speaking 10-, 11-, and 12-year-olds. Of
these children, 20% were recruited via and tested in the Kent Child Development Unit, as for Study
1. The remainder were tested in a quiet area of a school in the same region. Of the sample, 9 children
were tested but excluded from all analyses because they failed the ‘‘attention check.” An additional 2
children were removed from the sample because they had a diagnosed neurodevelopmental disorder,
and 1 child was removed because scores were anomalous (4 standard deviations away from the
mean). When rescoring offline our measure of structural language—namely the Vocabulary subtest
of the WASI (Wechsler, 2011)—it was ascertained that 9 children in the remaining sample did not
reach ceiling (prespecified stopping point) on this measure due to experimenter error. There were
missing data for the Card Sort for 1 child, for the knowledge test for 1 child, and for theory of mind
for 2 children. Thus, the final sample consisted of 72 children (35 boys) with a mean age of 143 months
(SD = 6.02, range = 126–156). Ethical approval was obtained from the School of Psychology ethics com-
mittee at the University of Kent. In addition to parental and teacher consent, child assent was always
obtained and children were told that they could take a break whenever they wished or desist testing
entirely if they preferred.
Irony and literal interpretation task
We used only the forced-choice method for complex irony interpretation because children in Study
1 found the open-ended response measure to be more difficult than forced choice. (In addition,
although interrater reliability for the open-ended responses was good, it was not excellent.) For the
forced-choice measure in Study 2, we extended the scale to include seven items (shown in Appendix
C).
Additional measures
WASI Vocabulary subtest. In this test, participants were asked to define word meanings. For each item,
participants’ response could receive a score of either two points, one point, or zero points. For exam-
ple, for the item ‘‘tradition,” participants would receive zero points if they referred to either something
one celebrates or a legend. Participants would receive one point if they referred to a family pattern,
Table 3
Predictors of simple irony.
Step Variable Β SE t sr2
1 Nonverbal reasoning (BAS-3) T score .26 .15 1.78" .07
Structural language (Formulated Sentences scaled score) .17 .15 1.16 .03
2 Nonverbal reasoning (BAS-3) T score .27 .15 1.88" .06
Structural language (Formulated Sentences scaled score) .08 .17 0.50 .00
Theory of mind direct (Strange Stories) .03 .16 0.20 .00
Theory of mind indirect (ToMI) .33 .14 2.38** .09
General knowledge (WISC Information Test) .24 .16 1.49 .03
Working memory (Backward Digit Span) .18 .14 1.34 .03
Inhibitory control (Stroop RT incongruent  RT congruent) .07 .15 0.49 .00
Cognitive flexibility (Card Sort) .41 .15 2.70** .12
Note. sr2, squared part correlation; BAS-3, British Ability Scale–Third Edition; ToMI, Theory of Mind Inventory; WISC, Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children; RT, reaction time.
" p < .10.
** p < .01.
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ipants needed to be more specific (e.g., something one does/a ritual/a theme that is passed on/re-
peated from generation to generation or else a set of values/behaviors rooted in the history/past).
Participant responses to this test were audio-recorded and transcribed offline. The ceiling (stopping
level) was three consecutive scores of zero. There were 31 items, so the maximum possible raw score
was 62. However, the highest score obtained in our sample was a raw score of 37.Cognitive flexibility. We used the same computer-based Wisconsin Card Sort Task as in Study 1 follow-
ing the same procedure.WASI Matrices (nonverbal reasoning). Similarly to the BAS Matrices used in Study 1, in the WASI Matri-
ces used in Study 2, participants saw for each item a matrix of four geometric shapes, where the fourth
item was missing. Participants needed to choose one of five possibilities to complete the matrix. The
ceiling (stopping level) was three consecutive scores of zero. The maximum possible raw score was 30,
but the highest score obtained in our sample was a raw score of 23.Theory of mind. We were concerned that typically developing young adolescents might score toward
ceiling on Strange Stories. Therefore, we selected the widely used Animations task (Abell, Happé, &
Frith, 2000) as an age-appropriate theory of mind measure. In this task, participants were asked to
narrate the actions of two inanimate shapes, specifically four animations, which tend to elicit use of
mental state terms. Participants were first shown a practice clip, which they saw three times. On
the first viewing, participants watched the clip passively. On the second viewing, participants narrated
the clip. On the third viewing, the experimenter said ‘‘This is what I think is happening” and narrated
the clip. For each of the four test items, participants viewed the clips twice, the first time without
attempting narration. No feedback (third viewing) was given for the test items.
The first author scored narrations of each animation on a 3-point scale in accordance with the cri-
teria outlined in Abell et al. (2000). For example, one clip showed a large triangle coaxing a small tri-
angle out of a box/house. If children merely described ‘‘pushing” or ‘‘fighting,” then this item would
receive a score of zero points. If children described reluctance to exit on the part of the small triangle,
then this item would receive a score of one point. If children described this item in terms of the big
triangle trying to urge (or something similar) the small triangle out, then this item would receive
the full score of two points. An independent rater scored the narrations produced by 10 participants
(13% of the data) with excellent reliability (ICC = .92).
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At the end of the session, participants were asked seven binary-choice questions that tested their
background knowledge relevant for the ironic videos presented at the beginning of the session (e.g.,
‘‘Do most people get invited to the Queen’s parties?”). For two items, a score of one half point was also
given for partially correct responses in which children provided an explanation as to why they thought
it was not a problem to be late for the cinema or why brothers might like helping their sisters to wash
the dishes (e.g., ‘‘There are 30-minute [advertisements] at the beginning anyway”).Procedure
The tasks were always administered in the following order: irony interpretation, WASI Vocabulary,
Card Sort task, WASI Matrices (nonverbal reasoning), theory of mind, and the knowledge test. The
entire testing session lasted 45 min. Participants were offered a break halfway through, but most
opted not to take it.Results
The full anonymized datasets are available on the Open Sciences Framework web pages (https://
osf.io/25k9m/). The overall performance for complex irony in Study 2 was significantly above chance,
t(71) = 5.85, p < .001. The descriptives for each variable are reported in Table 4.Correlational analyses
Complex irony interpretation correlated with all the predictor variables except age: nonverbal rea-
soning T score, r(72) = .39, p = .001; Vocabulary T score, r(72) = .39, p = .001; total specific knowledge
score, r(72) = .24, p = .043; and raw number of perseverative errors in the Card Sort, r(72) = .37,
p = .001. It correlated marginally with the theory of mind Animations task, r(72) = .23, p = .054.3Main analysis
We converted all variables to z scores and then entered them into a hierarchical linear regression.
In our regression analysis, T scores for nonverbal reasoning (Matrices) and structural language (Vocab-
ulary) were entered into the first step. This led to a model that was significant (p < .001) and accounted
for 23% of the variance. Then, theory of mind, cognitive flexibility, and specific knowledge predictors
all were entered into the second step. This led to a significant model, F(5, 66) = 4.700, p < .001,
accounting for 33% of variance overall and showing an R2 change of .10. As can be seen from Table 5,
in this second step only cognitive flexibility and nonverbal reasoning were significant. Multicollinear-
ity was not a concern (tolerance for all > .80).
To verify our results, we reran the same analysis, this time including only those predictors that
were significant in the first analysis, namely nonverbal reasoning, structural language, and cognitive
flexibility (Card Sort). The same pattern of results was found in this as in the previous analysis; here,
Card Sort (b = .27, t = 2.60, p = .011) accounted for a slightly greater proportion of unique variance
(7%), whereas both nonverbal reasoning (b = .24, t = 2.20, p = .031) and Vocabulary (b = .24, t = 2.27,
p = .026) accounted for 5% of unique variance. The values for tolerance were similar to the above val-
ues (all > .83).Knowledge interpretation
For those knowledge items that were answered incorrectly, 62.5% of the equivalent irony interpre-
tation items were also answered incorrectly. Conversely, for those knowledge items that were
answered correctly, 57.2% of the equivalent irony interpretation items were also answered correctly.
Thus, although the relationship between knowledge and irony analyzed in this manner was significant
(v2 = 6.215, p = .045)—and also approached significance in the regression analysis (see Table 5)—req-
uisite background knowledge is clearly insufficient for the correct interpretation of complex irony.3 The theory of mind Animations task showed a negative correlation with cognitive flexibility, r(72) = .37, p = .002.
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In two studies, we investigated whether the previously reported relationship between theory of
mind and verbal irony interpretation in children might in fact be better accounted for in terms of exec-
utive functioning, specifically cognitive flexibility. Unlike the vast majority of previous studies, we did
not solely examine children’s interpretation of simple irony, where the concurrent physical evidence
from the real world reveals that the speaker cannot intend the utterance literally. Rather, we also
assessed children’s understanding of more complex irony for which the listener must access cultural
or general knowledge to determine that the literal meaning is not intended. Both studies statistically
controlled for nonverbal reasoning, structural language, and knowledge understanding. Study 1 found
that both cognitive flexibility and (parent-assessed) theory of mind accounted for unique variance in
how 6- to 8-year-olds interpreted simple irony (whereas inhibitory control and working memory did
not). In Study 2, theory of mind showed a marginally significant correlation (with a small to medium
effect size) with complex irony interpretation by 10- to 12-year-olds. However, theory of mind did not
contribute unique variance to the regression analysis, whereas cognitive flexibility did.The role of knowledge and nonverbal reasoning
General knowledge was not found to correlate with simple irony interpretation in Study 1, but
there was a correlation (with a small to medium effect size) in Study 2 between complex irony inter-
pretation and the specific knowledge required for the vignettes we used. In the regression analysis,
this relationship was only of marginal significance. This—and our chi-square analysis—suggests that
although the requisite knowledge is accessed in order to interpret irony, this does not play as impor-
tant a role as cognitive flexibility or even as important a role as nonverbal reasoning ability.
Indeed, the current studies are the first in this field to statistically control for the role played by
nonverbal reasoning. Our findings are an important contribution on this point because in Study 2
we found that nonverbal reasoning was a significant contributor to unique variance in irony interpre-
tation (and showed a marginally significant relationship in Study 1). It is difficult to know exactly how
to interpret the role of nonverbal reasoning in irony interpretation. It could merely play a relatively
superficial role; children with better reasoning ability might be better able to determine the correct
answer from the selection of three choices simply by induction. A non-mutually exclusive possibility
is that, on the whole, neurotypical children who attain higher nonverbal reasoning scores tend to also
perform better on both executive functioning and structural language measures and indeed on all
developmental measures. Thus, nonverbal reasoning might have mediated the reported relationships
between irony interpretation and theory of mind in previous studies.The role of theory of mind
Regarding theory of mind, we found in Study 2 that the relationship between the Animations the-
ory of mind task (Abell et al., 2000) and complex irony had a small to medium effect size (and was
marginally significant). The relationship between theory of mind, as assessed by Strange Stories
(e.g., White et al., 2009) and irony, had a similar effect size in Study 1. However, these relationships
between irony interpretation and directly assessed theory of mind were not retained in regression
analyses in either study. In contrast, in Study 1 we found a medium to strong effect size for the rela-
tionships between the parental questionnaire theory of mind measure (ToMI) and simple irony inter-
pretation, which was retained in our regression analyses.
These somewhat inconclusive results regarding the relationship between theory of mind and child
irony interpretation led us to reexamine the previous literature in a more fine-grained manner. We
noted that whereas two studies had found large effect sizes for the relationship between theory of
mind and child irony interpretation (Caillies et al., 2014; Filippova & Astington, 2008), others had
found only medium effect sizes (Angeleri & Airenti, 2014; Banasik, 2013) or small effect sizes
(Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen, 2013; Nilsen et al., 2011). Moreover, of those studies that had found med-
ium or large effect sizes, all except one study were difficult to interpret because they either had not
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for Study 2.
M SD Min score Max score N
Nonverbal reasoning (WASI Matrices) T score 46.28 7.29 25 62 72
Structural language (WASI Vocabulary) T score 45.51 6.62 29 61 72
Theory of mind Animations (maximum possible = 8) 5.10 1.94 0 8 72
Specific knowledge raw total (maximum possible = 7) 6.35 0.60 4.5 7 72
Cognitive flexibility (Card Sort) raw perseverative errors 6.40 3.76 1 16 72
Complex irony (proportion correct) .55 .31 0 1 72
Note. WASI, Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence.
Table 5
Study 2 predictors of complex irony.
Step Variable Β SE t sr2
1 Nonverbal reasoning (WASI Matrices) T score .30 .12 2.72** .08
Structural language (WASI Vocabulary) T score .30 .11 2.67** .08
2 Nonverbal reasoning (WASI Matrices) T score .24 .11 2.19* .05
Structural language (WASI Vocabulary) T score .21 .11 1.92" .04
Theory of mind direct (Animations) .11 .12 1.03 .01
Specific knowledge .18 .11 1.68" .03
Cognitive flexibility (Card Sort) .23 .18 2.10* .04
Note. sr2, squared part correlation; WASI, Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence.
" p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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irony with nonironic joke understanding (Angeleri & Airenti, 2014).
The results of the remaining studies were also less clear than at first sight. Filippova and Astington
(2008) reported that the relationship with theory of mind was retained in their regression analyses,
but in fact this relationship was only marginally significant. Nilsen et al. (2011) only found a signifi-
cant relationship between theory of mind and whether children interpreted irony as mean versus nice
but not whether children correctly interpreted the communicative intent of the ironist. In addition,
the particular component of theory of mind that was found to relate to irony varied between studies.
Worse, in some studies theory of mind showed larger effect sizes for relationships with literal lan-
guage interpretation than for relationships with irony interpretation (e.g., Mewhort-Buist & Nilsen,
2013).
Despite the aforementioned lack of clarity regarding the empirical findings, we argue that listeners
logically must access some form of shared mental representations to interpret irony—particularly
more complex irony. For example, if Tom says ‘‘I was invited to a party by the most beautiful girl in
my class” and Sally replies ‘‘Yeah, and I was invited to the Queen’s party,” it does not suffice to know
that the Queen is unlikely to have invited Sally to a party. Listeners must also take into account that
Sally knows that Tom knows the Queen has probably not invited her, otherwise Sally’s utterance
would merely be interpreted as a lie. Other examples of complex irony may require listeners to access
the common ground understanding that they share with a particular speaker. For example, if a speaker
asks someone to wash the speaker’s plate and the addressee responds by asking whether he or she
should tidy the speaker’s room as well, the first speaker must consider his or her personal relationship
with the addressee (e.g., a sibling vs. an overly submissive romantic partner) and other circumstances
(e.g., perhaps the addressee knows that the speaker’s arms are injured). Therefore, we conclude that
the relationship between theory of mind and child irony interpretation warrants much closer
examination in future research.
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We found that cognitive flexibility emerged as a consistent predictor of verbal irony interpretation
across our two studies. Moreover, cognitive flexibility accounted for unique variance when controlling
for structural language, nonverbal reasoning, theory of mind, and knowledge. One possible explana-
tion for why cognitive flexibility correlates with irony interpretation could simply be that cognitive
flexibility requires both working memory and inhibitory control, and both of these are logically impli-
cated in irony interpretation. This particular account does not receive empirical support from the cur-
rent study; rather, Study 1 found no relationships between irony interpretation and either working
memory (as assessed by a standardized test, the WISC Backward Digit Span) or inhibitory control
(as assessed by the commonly used Stroop task).
An alternative explanation for the current finding that cognitive flexibility correlates with irony
interpretation is that this is due to the ‘‘switching” element of cognitive flexibility. Switching is
required in two aspects of irony interpretation. First, dynamic theory of mind itself requires the ability
to switch between one’s own perspective and the interlocutor’s perspective. In addition, when pro-
cessing an ironic remark, the listener needs to consider more than one possible interpretation of
the speaker’s communicative intent. We propose that this (rapid and often unconscious) consideration
of multiple intended meanings is highly likely to involve an element of switching.
This suggestion that irony interpretation always involves the activation of multiple potential
meanings does not, of course, fit with all theories of irony, particularly not with Gibbs’s (2002) direct
access account, in which it is proposed that the ironic meaning can in some contexts be activated
directly without first activating the literal meaning. Importantly, recent studies of adults using
timecourse-sensitive techniques, such as eye tracking and event-related potentials, throw clearer light
on this issue; they show that although highly familiar irony, for example, may initially be processed
more rapidly, it loses this advantage in later processing stages and becomes more difficult to process
than literal items (Turcan & Filik, 2016). Indeed, overall this body of literature indicates that although
irony familiarity and context play an important role, irony or sarcasm incurs a higher processing load
overall than literal language (e.g., Filik, Leuthold, Wallington, & Page, 2014; Olkoniemi, Strömberg, &
Kaakinen, 2019).
Moreover, we emphasize that for more complex irony, the requisite switching is not only between
a literal meaning and an ironic meaning but also between various possible interpretations of the ironic
content. For example, when processing ‘‘Sure, I’ve just been sitting round all day at school” in response
to ‘‘Can you help me cook because I am tired,” the listener very likely needs to switch between a con-
sideration of whether this response indicates a refusal to help and one of whether the response is
merely an expression of annoyance.
Limitations
The current research should be considered with three key limitations in mind. First, our results
(and indeed those in the previous literature) regarding the relationship between theory of mind are
not conclusive in either direction. Future developmental studies should include a number of theory
of mind—and emotion recognition—measures and should control for both nonverbal reasoning and
structural language. In an ideal world, researchers would have access to scalable advanced measures
of theory of mind, which are not so language heavy. Future studies should also include a sample size
suitable for medium effect sizes in multiple regression.
Second, although we did not find any relationships in Study 1 between simple irony interpretation
and either inhibitory control or working memory, this null result is based on one study—and using
only one measure for each construct. Therefore, it would be well worth replicating using multiple
workingmemory and inhibitory control measures and also examining any potential relationships with
complex irony.
Finally, we only investigated relationships between these variables—and only at one time point
during development at that. A more robust test would be to train children’s cognitive flexibility
(see, e.g., Kenworthy et al., 2014, for a child EF training program that appears to affect social commu-
nication). If training cognitive flexibility led to improved irony interpretation, this would allow us to
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be an important step forward for children with atypical development who struggle with irony
interpretation—particularly because theory of mind training does not seem to generalize to social
communication (e.g., Begeer et al., 2015; Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin, & Hill, 1996; see also
Pexman, Reggin & Lee, 2019, for a general discussion of irony training in children).Conclusions
The cognitive correlates of complex irony interpretation in young adolescents (structural language,
nonverbal reasoning, and cognitive flexibility) appear to be very similar to those of simple irony inter-
pretation in primary school-aged children. Importantly, cognitive flexibility retains significance as a
predictor of irony interpretation ability even when controlling for requisite knowledge, structural lan-
guage, and nonverbal reasoning. Given our weaker and less consistent results for relationships
between theory of mind and irony interpretation, we suggest that the role of executive
functioning—particularly cognitive flexibility—may be a more fruitful line of research for those inter-
ested in how children learn to interpret irony.CRediT authorship contribution statement
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Practice vignettes
1. Tom: Where are you going?
Sally: I am going to the toilet.A. I want to tell you that I’m going to the shop.
B. I want to tell that I’m going home.
C. I want to tell you that I’m going to the toilet.2. Sally: Where did you buy your shoes?
Tom: In the shoe shop around the corner.A. My sister bought me this new pair of shoes.
B. This is not my new pair of shoes.
C. I bought them in the shop around the corner.
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9 = difficult)1. Boy: Can I have a sweet (candy)?a
Girl: [hands him an empty
wrapper]
Boy: Thanks a lot!A. It’s kind of her to give
me the wrapper.
B. It’s selfish of her to
give me the wrapper.
C. She has helped me not
to get fat.97 4.462. Tom knocked over a glass and
spilled the juice over the clean
tablecloth.
Sally: Well done!A. I am glad that you
didn’t break the glass.
B. I am cross that you
knocked over the juice.
C. The tablecloth looks
better with juice stains.100 4.713. Sally wants to help Tom with
math, but he does not follow her
instructions.
Sally: You are a great listener.A. You didn’t interrupt
me when I was giving the
instructions.
B. You listened to me,
and you are great at
following the
instructions.
C. You weren’t listening
to me when I was giving
the instructions.95 4.974. Sally and Tom are eating crisps
(chips) in the park.b One crisp falls
on the ground. Sally picks it up
and eats it.
Tom: Yummy!A. I wish I could eat a
crisp, too.
B. I am disgusted that
you ate a dirty snack.
C. I am very worried
about your health.97 4.975. Sally and Tom want to go for a
picnic.c It has just started to rain.
Tom: It’s a perfect day for picnic.A. I like it when it’s sunny
when we go for a picnic.
B. I don’t like when it’s
hot and sunny in the
park.
C. I am upset that we
can’t go out because it’s
raining.87 5.03aThis vignette is adapted from an item in Bosco and Bucciarelli (2008).
bThis vignette is loosely based on an item from Bucciarelli, Colle, and Bara (2003).
cThis picnic vignette is adapted from Happé (1994).
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9 = difficult)1. Tom: I have been invited to a
party by the most beautiful girl
in my class.
Sally: Yeah, and I have been
invited to the queen’s party.A. I think that the queen’s
party would be more
interesting.
B. I don’t believe that you
were invited to that girl’s
party.
C. I don’t want to talk about
that beautiful girl’s party.82 6.032. Matt and Emma are going to the
cinema. They are late because
Emma is getting ready very
slowly.
Matt: Don’t worry, Emma. Take
your time.A. I am a bit annoyed that
you are not ready yet.
B. It’s fine that you’re
slow—we have got plenty
of time.
C. I am happy that the film
starts so early.92 5.113. Sally: Could you wash my plate?
Tom: Do you want me to tidy
your room, too?A. I definitely will not help
you with washing up.
B. I like taking care of my
sister.
C. I feel sorry for you, so I
will help you.92 6.064.
A: Would you like me to hold the
umbrella over you?
B: No, I really like getting wet.A. I am upset that you
brought the umbrella with
you.
B. No, I don’t want the
umbrella because I want to
get wet.
C. Of course I want the
umbrella, so I think your
question is stupid.87 5.065. Sally: Do you think I should
package up the phone before
posting (mailing) it?
Tom: No, just put a stamp on it
and pop it into the post
(mailbox).A. Of course you need to
package it up before
posting.
B. This phone does not
need to be packed before
posting.
C. I am surprised that you
want to package the phone.84 5.976. Tom: Can you help me cook the
dinner? I’m tired.
Sally: Oh yes, because I have just
been sitting around doing
nothing at school todayA. I’m cross because you do
not understand what a bad
day I have had.
B. I’m actually saying ‘‘no”
because I am too tired to
cook with you.84 5.75(continued on next page)






9 = difficult)C. I will help you to make
the dinner because I’m
really bored.7. Matt and Emma are in the
bathroom.
Matt: Before you brush your
teeth, you have to put toothpaste
on your toothbrush.
Emma: No way! Really?A. I think that everyone
knows what you are telling
me about brushing teeth.
B. I didn’t know that
I should put the toothpaste
on the toothbrush first.
C. I am surprised that you
know how to brush your
teeth.84 4.78References
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